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The Economics of Anticipatory Adjudication
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner
Introduction
A bedrock principle of the judicial power of the United States is that federal
courts may decide concrete cases only—not hypothetical ones that may or may
not develop into real cases sometime in the future. This principle has been
inferred from Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which describes the jurisdiction
of federal courts in terms of “cases” or “controversies” (considered synonyms),
and has become embodied in a host of subsidiary principles. Thus, federal courts
are not empowered to render advisory opinions; to decide lawsuits that are moot
in the sense that a judgment would not give the party obtaining it a concrete
beneÞt, or that are “unripe” (premature); to entertain a case brought by someone
who, because he has not been injured or could not be tangibly beneÞted by winning the suit, is said to lack a personal stake in the outcome and hence cannot
establish his “standing” to sue; to decide a collusive (friendly) suit, that is, one
where the parties’ interests are not really adverse; or to decide a hypothetical
case.1 Federal courts are supposed to wait for an actual case to arise from a
violation of law that has inßicted, or at the minimum is about to inßict, tangible
harm on the party bringing the suit, who if he wins will be able to prevent or
reduce the harm or shift the cost, or some of it at least, to someone else.2
Yet there are many seeming exceptions. Declaratory judgments often resolve
questions involving legal rights or duties before a party has taken any action that
might violate anyone’s legal rights. A related procedure, the suit to quiet title,
permits a party to sue to remove a cloud on his title to real property so that he
can act free of any claim to the property. A party to a contract who announces
that he intends to break the contract in the future can be sued today (in federal
court if a federal jurisdictional basis such as diversity of citizenship is present) for
“anticipatory breach” even though, the time for his performance not having
arrived, no actual breach can yet have occurred and, if he changed his mind, an
actual breach might never occur. A litigant in federal as in state court can move
for a preliminary injunction to head off anticipated as well as actual harm. The
doctrine of collateral estoppel gives Þndings of fact made in one proceeding
preclusive effect in future proceedings. Persons and Þrms subject to
administrative regulations often can sue to enjoin enforcement of a regulation or
have it declared invalid even though the regulation has not yet been applied to
1

For a helpful discussion of the doctrines derived from Article III that we discuss in this
paper, see Lea Brilmayer, “The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the ‘Case or
Controversy’ Requirement,” 93 Harvard Law Review 297 (1979).
2

This description doesn’t quite Þt the case where the plaintiV is the prosecutor, whether a
public prosecutor or a private bounty hunter; but in either case the plaintiV can be conceived of
as a representative of the actual victims of the violation.
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them, and if it were applied to them they could get it invalidated in the suit
brought to require them to comply with it or to punish them for their
noncompliance. Agency staff render legal advice (as in the Securities and
Exchange Commission’s no-action letters or the Internal Revenue Service’s
private letter rulings) and sometimes the agencies themselves render advisory
opinions. Agencies are also empowered to issue declaratory orders, the
administrative equivalent of declaratory judgments.
States are not bound by the limitations that Article III has been interpreted to
impose on federal courts, and ten states allow their highest courts to render
advisory opinions, at the request of the legislature or the governor, on the
constitutionality of newly enacted state statutes or on other important issues.
Federal administrative agencies, whether they are independent or part of the
executive branch, are not subject to Article III either, and besides issuing advisory opinions many of them promulgate rules before a violation of the norm
embodied in the rule has occurred—unlike common law courts, which to avoid
criticism that they are acting prospectively, like a legislature or an agency,
invariably apply even a newly declared norm to the litigants in the case before
them and usually apply it to litigants in all pending cases. Preventive detention,
for example refusing on the basis of a preliminary hearing to admit to bail a
person accused of crime but not yet tried or convicted, is a form of anticipatory
adjudication when bail is denied on the ground that the accused poses a danger
to the community.
So what is going on? Obviously, much litigation (and related activity of a
judicial or quasi-judicial character) is anticipatory, yet there is a reluctance to
allow such litigation routinely. Does this reluctance make sense? Is the pattern of
permission and prohibition sketched above coherent? Those are the issues
discussed in this paper, along with such subsidiary questions as the following:
Why do advisory opinions dealing with the constitutionality of state statutes and
regulations have less precedential signiÞcance than opinions in “real” cases?
Why does the Tax Court, which is not an Article III court, refuse to issue
advisory opinions, while the Internal Revenue Service does issue them, in the
form of its private letter rulings? Administrative agencies that have adjudicative
powers, such as the Federal Trade Commission, nevertheless issue declaratory
orders much less frequently than courts issue declaratory judgments; why this
difference? We use economic analysis not only to answer these and other speciÞc
questions but also to bring out the commonality among issues that lawyers often
place in unrelated doctrinal pigeonholes, to cast the light of economics on an area
quintessentially of technical law,3 and to explore the possibility that here as
elsewhere the law makes more economic sense than most judges, lawyers, and
3

Law-school courses on federal jurisdiction or federal courts are redoubts of lawyers’ law, so
one is not surprised that the subject matter of such courses has been largely ignored by
economists.
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law professors believe. An interesting question that we do not discuss is why the
use of anticipatory adjudication is (as it appears to be) growing relative to ex post
adjudication.
It may seem obvious, and therefore not worth discussion, why resolving legal
disputes before anyone is hurt would be, with only the rarest exceptions, a bad
idea. It would consume potentially enormous resources by requiring courts to
decide hypothetical, contingent, inchoate, premature, abstract, not yet fully
developed disputes that, left alone by the courts for a time, might not require judicial resolution at all. In addition to multiplying the resources consumed in
litigation and judicial decision making, anticipatory adjudication would (it may
seem) inevitably increase the amount and hence the cost of judicial error.4 There
is greater risk of deciding a case incorrectly when there is little or no factual
record and questions of injury, of damages, and of the social costs and beneÞts of
the defendant’s and the plaintiff’s activities are therefore hypothetical.
But this is not the whole story. Anticipatory adjudication can provide vital
information to Þrms or individuals uncertain whether a proposed course of
action will expose them to liability in damages or to criminal or other penalties.
Removing uncertainty on this score can confer two beneÞts. Some persons who
would have run the risk of sanctions will decide not to do so if a court declares
that their proposed actions are indeed unlawful. The harm that the action would
have created as well as the cost of administering sanctions to the actor is thereby
averted. And other persons, who would be deterred from acting by the risk of
sanctions, will act if the court gives them a green light, and the result may be
socially as well as privately beneÞcial action. Clearly, we face a complicated set
of tradeoffs, which an economic model may help to sort out.
I. A Model of Optimal Anticipatory Litigation
Our analysis5 begins with the assumption that the legal consequences (which
may of course depend on factual consequences) of a given action are uncertain.
Otherwise an advisory opinion, a declaratory judgment, or any other form of
4

The costs of a judicial system can usefully be decomposed into administrative and error

costs.
5

Which borrows from Steven Shavell’s and Louis Kaplow’s pioneering analysis of the value
of information provided by lawyers’ advice rendered in advance of the client’s taking an action
that might be sanctioned. See Shavell’s articles “Legal Advice about Contemplated Acts: The
Decision to Obtain Advice, Its Social Desirability, and Protection of ConÞdentiality,” 17 Journal of
Legal Studies 123 (1988), and “Liability and the Incentive to Obtain Information about Risk,” 21
Journal of Legal Studies 259 (1992); also Kaplow and Shavell, “Private versus Socially Optimal
Provision of Ex Ante Legal Advice,” 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 306 (1992). We
modify their analysis to allow both for the possibility of a greater likelihood of legal error when a
case is decided before rather than after a party acts and for the diVerence in costs of anticipatory
and ex post adjudication itself. Our formal sapproach to legal error follows that of A. Mitchell
Polinsky and Steven Shavell, “Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law,” 5
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 99 (1989).
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anticipatory adjudication would provide no information and would therefore be
all costs and no beneÞts. Thus, if A is considering poisoning B, A’s obtaining a
decision in advance on the lawfulness of the act would confer no beneÞt. As A
already knows that his action is unlawful, an advisory opinion would give him
no new information.6 But let A be considering taking an action that would violate
a possibly unconstitutional—not certainly unconstitutional or certainly
constitutional—law, and he would beneÞt from learning with certainty whether
the law was unconstitutional, because the information would enable him to
optimize his actions. Or suppose that he is considering putting up a building on
property that he believes—but again without certainty—that he owns. He would
beneÞt from a resolution of any potential dispute over who owns the property
before he begins construction. Or suppose he would like to use a new technology
but is unsure whether it would infringe B’s patent. Knowing the answer to this
question would be valuable information for A to have before he decides whether
to use the technology.
A fundamental question is why, if the problem is uncertainty, the private
market for legal services is not the solution. A lawyer can advise on the
likelihood of a particular course of action resulting in litigation adverse to his
client and we suppose could guarantee his advice, although this is not important
because we assume risk neutrality.7 There are two answers to this question. The
Þrst and less important is that a judge may be a better predictor of the outcome
of future litigation over an issue than a private lawyer, not because the judge is
smarter but because he is predicting his own behavior or that of a member of his
“club” (the judiciary); a countervailing factor is that the lawyer may have more
information than the judge because the client will “level” with his lawyer, thanks
to the attorney-client privilege. The more important consideration is that,
provided the anticipatory adjudication has preclusive effect, that is, that it cannot
be reversed by subsequent adjudication after the anticipated act materializes, the
judge does not merely produce a different probability of a given outcome for the
party to consider; he changes a probability distribution into a certainty, and this
can affect behavior even if everyone is risk neutral. For example, a person who
would not have acted if the probability of his being sanctioned afterward were .3
may act if anticipatory adjudication reduces that probability to zero, and a
person who would have acted if the probability of his being sanctioned
afterward were .7 may decide not to act if he discovers through anticipatory
adjudication that his probability of being sanctioned is 1. It is no answer that the
lawyer could guarantee his advice, because he will do it only for a fee equal to
the risk that he assumes. This means that the client will have to pay a fee equal to
6

It might give B information that he is in danger of being poisoned, and also increase the
likelihood that A will be apprehended and punished if he succeeds in murdering B. These
however are not private beneÞts to A and would not motivate him to seek an advisory opinion.
7

The provision of such advice by lawyers is the principal subject of the papers by Kaplow
and Shavell referred to in note 5 above.
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the expected cost of the ex post sanction, and if, we assume risk neutrality, will
thus have gained nothing from the guarantee.8
a. The Social Value of Acting
Let A be contemplating an action that would yield him a beneÞt of X. Let pe
be the subjective probability to A that this action would result in a damages
judgment, Þne, forfeiture, permanent injunction, or other legal sanction against A
that would impose upon him a cost of D. We assume that D > X in present-value
terms, so that, if pe = 1, A would not take the action; it would yield him a net loss.
But pe = 1 is counterfactual in our analysis; we assume that 0 < pe < 1 because
either it is uncertain that a court would uphold the validity of the law that A will
be accused of violating or A’s act may fall outside the scope of a valid law. To
simplify exposition we ignore other possible forms of uncertainty, including
uncertainty over whether the action will inßict injury (and if so how much) and
will actually precipitate a civil or criminal lawsuit, a possibility that we take up
later, however, and we continue to assume that the parties are risk neutral.
If A takes the action, he faces not only a possibility of having to pay D but
also a potential cost C of defending himself against a lawsuit brought in order to
impose D on him. Nevertheless he will take the action as long as the present
value of his expected net income from it, Ve, is positive, where
Ve = X – peD – Ce.

(1)

Ve is net expected income from an action taken by A but not adjudicated, at a
cost to A of Ce, until after A acts. We call adjudication that occurs after A acts “ex
post adjudication” and denote it by the subscript “e.”9 The typical civil suit or
8

To explain, suppose the lawyer believes that the probability is .7 that a court will Wnd A’s
act lawful after A acts. For a fee, the lawyer might guarantee to pay A’s damages in the event the
court Wnds against A after he acts. Given this guarantee, A can act without fear of liability. But
this is not equivalent to anticipatory adjudication because A will have to pay an up front fee for
the guarantee equal to .3 multiplied by damages plus litigation costs. Putting risk aversion to one
side, this fee eliminates any beneWt from the guarantee since A’s expected damages from acting
and risking paying damages if a court Wnds his act unlawful is equal to the fee A pays for the
guarantee. In contrast, anticipatory adjudication just requires that A pay litigation costs for
obtaining information on whether he can act without fear of liability.
9

In contrast, the subscript “a” refers to anticipatory adjudication. So pa for example is the
probability that anticipatory adjudication will Þnd A’s prospective action unlawful.
It may be helpful to the reader if we deÞne at this point the principal notation used in the
paper:
X = the beneÞt from A’s act;
pe = the probability that ex post adjudication will sanction A’s act;
1,

2 = Type I and Type II error, respectively;

pa = the probability that anticipatory adjudication will Wnd A’s prospective act unlawful;
D = the amount of damages A will pay if sanctioned ex post;
Ce, Ca = the social cost of ex post and anticipatory litigation, respectively;
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criminal prosecution is ex post in this sense because it is Þled after the defendant
has acted. We can see from equation (1) that A is more likely to act and risk
sanctions the lower are pe (the probability of being sanctioned), D (the cost of the
sanction), and Ce (the cost of the ex post adjudication) and the greater X (the
beneÞt from acting) is.
In order to evaluate the social gain or loss from anticipatory adjudication, we
make the further assumption that Ve equals not only A’s net income but also
society’s expected welfare when the court decides the lawfulness of A’s act after
he acts. Thus, X, pe, D, and Ce denote both private and social values of these
variables. This makes our initial deÞnition of Ce incomplete, because it excludes
both the plaintiff’s (or prosecutor’s) litigation costs and the costs of the judicial
system itself to the extent that they are not fully borne by the litigants, in the
form of court fees. Yet it does not follow that Ce will in every case understate the
full costs of dispute resolution. A judicial decision may create a precedent that
provides valuable information to other parties, and this external beneÞt would
require a downward adjustment in the social costs of litigating A’s dispute.
Provisionally, we assume that these factors cancel out, so that Ce equals both the
private and social costs of ex post adjudication. It would be simple enough,
however, to adjust Ce both for the plaintiff’s costs and for the precedential
signiÞcance of the decision. RedeÞne Ce as A’s litigation cost, and let g be a
parameter that transforms Ce into a social cost. If the litigation has little
precedential signiÞcance, if the plaintiff incurs substantial litigation costs, and if
there are signiÞcant public subsidies for litigation, g is likely to exceed 1. But if
the precedential signiÞcance of the decision is great, g could be less than 1 and
could even take a negative value. A further complication is the possibility of an
out-of-court settlement after A acts. To skirt it, we assume that if A is sued he can
settle by paying an amount equal to peD + Ce. This makes Ve the same whether A
litigates or settles.
We assume that if the court either invalidates the law or holds it inapplicable
to A, D = 0; that is (in a civil litigation), A has incurred no damages liability. This
may seem unrealistic. A perfectly lawful action can cause “damage,” in the sense
of harm, even if the damage does not result in an award of legal damages or in
any other legal sanction. Moreover, the amount of damage, especially in relation
to the beneÞt to the actor (X), may affect the court’s decision on the validity or
application of the law. We can model this case by supposing that A’s action
causes either high damage (Dh) with a probability pe or low damage (Dl) with a
probability (1 – pe), where Dh > X > Dl ≥ 0. Then peD in equation (1) would
become peDh + (1 – pe)Dl. Under a negligence regime A would be subject to
Ve, Va = the expected social value of A’s act when adjudication takes place after (ex post
adjudication) and before (anticipatory adjudication) A acts, respectively; and
Wa = the expected private value to A of anticipatory adjudication.

8
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sanction only if his act caused high damage (deÞned as harm that exceeded the
beneÞt), while under strict liability he would be subject to sanction even if his act
caused only low damage. As the more complicated model does not change any
of our important results, we use the simpler approach for the most part, which
assumes that Dl = 0.
b. A Is Deterred from Acting in the Absence of Anticipatory Adjudication
1. Social benefits and costs. Let Ve < 0, so that A decides not to act and by acting
risk the sanction. A’s decision is socially efÞcient because it is based on the full
expected beneÞts and costs of the act given the information available at the time
and because Ce reßects both A’s and society’s cost of ex post litigation. Now
suppose that a court is willing to decide before A acts whether his prospective
action would be lawful or not. Assume that the court’s decision will be deÞnitive.
Then if it Þnds A’s action lawful, A will undertake it, because he will gain X and
face neither the prospect of being sanctioned nor the prospect of incurring
litigation costs. Conversely, if the court Þnds the prospective action to be
unlawful, A will refrain because otherwise he would incur D—which by
assumption is greater than X—with certainty and would incur litigation costs to
boot.
We assume that the court has less information before than after A acts,
because in anticipatory adjudication the court must decide without the beneÞt of
information generated by the act itself. Such information might enable more
accurate measurement of the harms and beneÞts of an act (because they would
be realized, rather than merely predicted) and a more precise characterization of
the act, which might in turn enable a more conÞdent determination of whether
the act was prohibited.
The information deÞcit that characterizes anticipatory adjudication requires
us to consider carefully the two types of error that might occur in such
adjudication. We deÞne 1 as the probability that a court will Þnd A’s prospective
act lawful but would have found it unlawful had it decided the case after A
acted, and 2 as the probability that a court will Þnd A’s prospective act unlawful
but would have found it lawful had it decided the case after A acted. Thus 1 is
Type I error (“the probability of Þnding a guilty person innocent”), while 2 is
Type II error (“the probability of Þnding an innocent person guilty”). Of course
both types of error occur in full-ßedged, ex post adjudication as well as in
anticipatory adjudication, and although we ignore that possibility in the formal
analysis, 1 and 2 can be interpreted as the incremental Type I and Type II error
incurred in anticipatory adjudication. We assume, plausibly, that (1 – 1) > 2,
that is, that the probability that anticipatory adjudication will correctly Þnd A’s
act to be unlawful is greater if ex post adjudication would have found A’s act
unlawful rather than lawful. To simplify further, we take as given the levels of
legal error in anticipatory adjudication and, therefore, do not examine the social
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and private decisions to spend resources to reduce errors and improve the accuracy of such adjudication.10
The difference between Type I and Type II error is particularly important in
criminal litigation, where the latter is deemed to be much more costly than the
former. In contrast, in the civil context Type I and Type II errors are usually
assumed to be equally costly.11 Nevertheless the distinction between the two
types of error is important in explaining the pattern of anticipatory adjudication
in the civil area.
Since anticipatory adjudication will inform A whether he will have to pay
damages (or incur an equivalent legal sanction) if he acts, we can write Va, the
expected beneÞt to society (which, as we show shortly, differs from A’s expected
beneÞt), if A obtains a determination respecting the lawfulness of his conduct
prior to acting, as
Va = (1 – pa)X – pe1D – Ca,

(2)

(1 – pa) = (1 – pe)(1 – 2) + pe1.

(3)

where
The Þrst set of terms on the right-hand side of equation (2) is the gross expected
beneÞt from anticipatory adjudication: the beneÞt (X) from A’s act discounted by
the probability 1 – pa that anticipatory adjudication will Þnd the act lawful. The
probability (1 – pa) is, in turn, as shown in equation (3), a positive function of the
probability 1 – pe that A’s act would have been found lawful if litigated ex post,12
the probability that anticipatory adjudication would reach the same result (which
equals one minus Type II error), and the probability of Type I error.
To calculate the net expected beneÞt of anticipatory adjudication, we must
subtract from the gross beneÞt both pe1D, which is the expected harm that
results when anticipatory adjudication mistakenly exonerates a litigant who
should be sanctioned, and Ca, the cost of anticipatory adjudication. We expect
that Ca ≤ Ce, because the availability of more information after than before a
party acts is likely to increase the time devoted to discovery, pretrial
maneuvering and motions, and the trial itself. Lack of information sometimes
increases the cost of litigation because the parties hire more experts or
10

Two recent papers by Kaplow and Shavell investigate the optimal expenditure of resources
to reduce error and improve the accuracy of adjudication. See Kaplow and Shavell “Accuracy in
the Determination of Liability” (1992) and “Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages” (1992).
11

The diVerence between these weightings of Type I and Type II error is captured in the
diVerent standards of proof. The prosecutor in a criminal case must prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and this requirement creates a greater probability of Type I than of Type II
error. The civil plaintiV need prove liability only by a bare preponderance of the evidence,
implying a virtually equal probability of the two types of error.
12

We have ∂(1 – pa)/∂(1 – pe) = 1 – 2 – 1 > 0 (from the assumption that (1 – 1) > 2.
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commission elaborate studies to estimate beneÞts and harms from the proposed
course of action, but this is exceptional. Another reason to expect Ce to exceed Ca
is that the stakes are apt to be higher in ex post litigation because an injury has
occurred (see part 2.c). As a by-product, both Type I and Type II error may fall.
These considerations are reßected in our model, since the differences between
the costs of litigating anticipatory and ex post cases, and the incremental error of
anticipatory adjudication, are among the variables that we take into account.
By assumption, A would not act if he could not determine in advance (that is,
though anticipatory adjudication) that his act would not subject him to sanctions.
So society’s net expected beneÞt without anticipatory litigation is zero. With
anticipatory litigation it can be positive, negative, or zero. As is obvious from
equation (2), as well as intuitive, it is more likely to be positive the greater X and
the smaller pe, 1, 2, and Ca are. Alternatively, if there is very little doubt that A’s
act is unlawful and likely to cause signiÞcant harm (that is, if both pe and D are
high), the principal effect of anticipatory adjudication will be to allow some
people to get away with their unlawful acts because of legal error. This may
explain the traditional unavailability of anticipatory adjudication in criminal
matters, which tend to have a high pe and D (our poisoning case).
2. Private versus social benefits. The private and social beneÞts of anticipatory
adjudication need not be equal. Anticipatory adjudication enables A to avoid any
sanction for an unlawful act, for if he loses the anticipatory suit he will refrain
from the act. From A’s perspective, therefore, D drops out of the picture; the only
cost of anticipatory litigation to A is Ca. A’s expected gain is merely X discounted
by the probability that the court will Þnd his prospective act to be lawful. Hence
A’s (≠ society’s) net expected gain of anticipatory litigation, or Wa, is given by
Wa = (1 – pa)X – Ca

(4)

which differs from the social gain in equation (2) in that pe1D has dropped out,
so that Wa – Va = pe1D. The difference is caused by the fact that Type I error
creates a private beneÞt to A (equal to p1X) but a social loss [equal to p1(X –
D)]. The greater are p, Type I error, and D, the greater (other things being equal)
will be the difference between A’s private gain from anticipatory adjudication
and society’s gain.
Criminal prosecution again provides a helpful illustration. If Type 1 and Type
II error are assumed to be inversely related, then the effort to avoid Type II error
in criminal litigation implies that Type I error is high in such litigation; and we
have already noted that p and D are also likely to be high. Therefore Va is likely
to be negative while A’s private beneÞt from anticipatory adjudication, Wa, could
well be positive. It would be crazy if, in our poisoning hypothetical, the wouldbe poisoner could obtain an anticipatory adjudication in which the prosecutor
would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the poisoner would be
guilty of murder. Since a fully anticipatory criminal adjudication would take
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place before any criminal act was actually committed, a judgment of “guilty”
would not result in the imposition of punishment; hence there would be no
reason to employ the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
which is motivated by the heavy costs of criminal punishment to the convicted
person. But this means that anticipatory criminal adjudication wouldn’t look
much like criminal adjudication. We shall return to this point in part II, when we
discuss preenforcement judicial challenges to statutes and administrative rules.
As equation (4) shows, A beneÞts from Type I error but not from Type II
error, since errors of the latter type are against A.13 Whether on balance A
beneÞts from legal error is therefore unclear, although society clearly loses
because both types of error impose social costs.
Our emphasis on the risk of error (or, more precisely, on the incremental risk
of error) in anticipatory litigation may suggest a choice between litigation now,
in advance of action, and litigation later. But remember that we are assuming in
this part of the paper that if anticipatory adjudication is refused A will be
deterred from acting by the threat of sanctions and there will be no subsequent
adjudication. The presence of error costs in anticipatory adjudication may
nevertheless make it socially undesirable to issue an advisory opinion or other
anticipatory judgment that creates a positive probability that A will act. But what
if the court does not know whether A will not act unless it renders an
anticipatory adjudication? In that case the beneÞt of anticipatory adjudication
will be a weighted average of the beneÞts when, in the absence of anticipatory
adjudication, A does act (the case considered in the next section) and when, in
that absence, he doesn’t act, with the weights equal to the probabilities of each of
the two possibilities.
Our analysis implies that the private incentive to seek an anticipatory
adjudication is always greater than the social incentive [because equation (4) has
a greater value than equation (2)].14 Indeed, unless the private cost of litigation
(Ca) is very great, courts would be ßooded with requests for anticipatory
adjudication by persons deterred from acting by the prospect of being
sanctioned. We therefore predict that courts will be given greater discretion to
refuse to hear a case before than after a party acts, enabling them to turn down
13

Since (1 – pa) = (1 – pe)(1 –

2) + pe 1, it follows that Wa is increasing in

1 but decreasing

in 2.
14

This is true as well in the alternative model in which A’s act causes damages of either Dh or
Dl and Dh > X > Dl. Then the net social beneÞt of anticipatory adjudication equals (1 – pa)X – (1 –
pe)(1 – 2)Dl – pe 1Dh – Ca, and A’s private beneÞt (which substitutes Dl for Dh) equals (1 – pa)(X
– Dl) – Ca. With anticipatory adjudication, A always pays Dl if he acts (and never pays Dh
because, if a court determines that his prospective act would if carried out cause actionable harm
equal to Dh, he will not act). Since Dh > Dl, A’s private beneÞt exceeds the social beneÞt. Again
Type I error ( 1) is a private beneÞt (∂Wa/∂ 1 = pe(X – Dl) > 0) but a social cost (∂Va/∂ 1 = pe(X
– Dh) < 0).
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requests for anticipatory adjudication when the private gain is positive but the
social gain negative. SpeciÞcally, assuming that courts are guided by efÞciency
concerns we expect them to turn down more such requests the greater pe1D is.
For if the private value of anticipatory adjudication is positive (Wa), the social
value (Va) is more likely to be negative the greater the probability that A’s proposed action is in fact illegal, the greater the probability of the court’s Þnding the
proposed action legal in anticipatory adjudication when it is in fact illegal, and
the greater the harm from (and hence, other things being equal, the more severe
the sanction for) A’s act. As we show later, ripeness, mootness, and related
doctrines provide courts with convenient categories for refusing anticipatory
adjudication when it is unlikely to be socially beneÞcial.
The social costs of anticipatory adjudication are ampliÞed if, contrary to our
assumption that A’s private cost and the social cost of litigation are equal, the
latter is greater. Let ce and ca denote A’s private cost of ex post and anticipatory
litigation. Then all A’s who, but for anticipatory adjudication, would choose not
to act because their net income from acting would be negative (that is, We < 0
where We is A’s private value, calculated by substituting ce for Ce) behave
efÞciently because Ve has an even greater negative value than We when Ce
replaces ce. The difference between the private and the social gain from
anticipatory adjudication is also greater when the former nets out ca and the
latter nets out Ca. For then Wa – Va = pe1D + Ca – ca. In the special (but, as we
shall see, not always implausible) case in which ca = 0, A will always have a
positive gain from anticipatory adjudication [see equation (4)] even if the social
costs (pe1D + Ca) are much greater and make Va < 0 in equation (2).
c. A Will Act Even If He Cannot Obtain an Anticipatory Adjudication
We turn to the case where, because Ve (the private and social value of A’s act
when only ex post adjudication is available to determine its lawfulness15) is
positive, society wants A to act even if he cannot obtain an anticipatory
adjudication, and to take his chances on being sanctioned later. The expected
social gain from anticipatory adjudication in this case is the difference between
Va and Ve:
Va – Ve = pe(1 – 1)D – paX + (Ce – Ca),

(5)

pa = pe(1 – 1) + (1 – pe)2.

(6)

where
The expected beneÞt of anticipatory adjudication equals the probability, pe(1 –
1), of preventing a person from taking a socially harmful action multiplied by
15

Recall from equation (1) that we assume that society’s and A’s cost of ex post litigation are
equal, so that Ve denotes both society’s and A’s value of acting without anticipatory adjudication.
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the harm avoided (D) by preventing the act, plus the likely savings in litigation
costs from substituting anticipatory for ex post adjudication. The value of
encouraging a socially beneÞcial action disappears, because by hypothesis such
action would be taken if anticipatory adjudication were unavailable, assuming
the private beneÞt exceeded the private cost.
Other things being equal, this expected beneÞt is greater the greater pe, D,
and Ce – Ca are and the smaller is the probability of Type I error in anticipatory
adjudication. There is, however, an offsetting cost from anticipatory adjudication
in the case under consideration: the beneÞt (X) that is given up both when a
court correctly, and when it erroneously, condemns a proposed action that, but
for the anticipatory adjudication, would have gone forward.16 To calculate the
net expected beneÞt of anticipatory adjudication we must subtract this expected
cost of paX.
There are several interesting comparisons between the case where A will not
act in the absence of anticipatory adjudication [equation (2)] and the case where
he will [equation (5)]:
1. As in the earlier case, the private gain from anticipatory adjudication
exceeds the social gain. The private gain equals
Wa – Ve = peD – paX + Ce – Ca

(7)

which exceeds Va – Ve by pe1D, the expected private beneÞt from averting,
through legal error in anticipatory adjudication, a deserved sanction that would
have been imposed ex post.17 So again the number of such persons requesting
anticipatory adjudication will exceed the efÞcient number.
2. Legal error reduces the social beneÞt from anticipatory adjudication both
when a person will act in the absence of such adjudication and when he will not.
Moreover, the effect of changes in legal error are identical for (2) and (5). A unit
increase in Type I error reduces the expected gain from anticipatory adjudication
by pe(D – X), and a unit increase in Type II error reduces the expected gain by (1
16

It may seem odd to worry about a lost beneÞt from a murder or rape that a court correctly
prevents. But since we have shown that criminal acts are poor candidates for anticipatory
adjudication, the lost beneÞts in (5) are not likely to involve those types of activity.
17

Another factor that would increase the diVerence between Wa – Ve and Va – Ve is a positive
diVerence (if one exists) between the social and private costs of anticipatory adjudication.
However, if social cost also exceeds private cost in ex post adjudication, the net eVect of the
diVerences between the social and private cost of litigation on the diVerence between Wa – Ve (or,
more correctly, Wa – We where We is as deÞned below) and Va – Ve is uncertain. To see this, let ce
and ca denote private costs of litigation and deÞne We = X – peD – ce. as A’s private gain from
acting when litigation takes place ex post. Va – Ve could exceed Wa – We if Ce – Ca was greater
than ce – ca, although there is no a priori reason to assume that this will be the case.
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– pe)X, whether A will or will not go forward with his proposed course of action
if he does not obtain an anticipatory judgment authorizing it.18
3. An increase in p, the probability that A’s act is actually unlawful, will
reduce the social beneÞt of anticipatory adjudication in the case in which A will
not act unless anticipatory adjudication is available to him, but it will increase
the social beneÞt of that adjudication in the case in which A will act if there is no
anticipatory adjudication.19 The intuition behind this result is that in the former
case, when Ve < 0, the only potential social gain from anticipatory adjudication is
giving A a green light to act, and that expected gain is smaller the more likely it
is that the act is unlawful. In the latter case, where Ve > 0, the social gain from
such adjudication comes from inducing persons not to act, and that expected gain
is larger the greater the probability that the contemplated act is unlawful.
4. The cost of anticipatory adjudication tends to lower its social beneÞt more
when a person will not act without such adjudication than when he will. In the
former case, there is a net litigation cost of Ca. In the latter case, the incremental
cost of anticipatory adjudication will actually be negative if Ce > Ca and everyone
who acts without anticipatory adjudication is sued afterward. If not everyone
who acts is sued ex post, or if some of those suits are settled before trial, the
incremental cost of anticipatory adjudication may be positive notwithstanding
the assumed greater cost of litigating a dispute after a party acts than before. We
predict therefore that courts will be more willing to provide anticipatory
adjudication in cases in which the party is quite likely to act, and to be sued if he
acts, for then the incremental cost of anticipatory adjudication may be slight or
even negative. Alternatively, if in the absence of anticipatory adjudication A
would not act or if he did the parties would be likely to settle out of court, we
predict that courts will be less willing to provide anticipatory adjudication. If A
in this situation seeks such an adjudication his suit may be dismissed on the
ground that it is unripe, that he lacks standing, or that the suit presents no real
case or controversy.
5. Suppose that A will act in the absence of anticipatory adjudication only
because his private cost of litigation ex post is lower than the social cost—that is,
he would not act if he faced Ce instead of ce, where ce < Ce. The social beneÞt of
anticipatory adjudication, Va – Ve in equation (5), will increase since now Ve is
negative. Anticipatory adjudication becomes more valuable because it can prevent acts that prospectively have a negative expected value when the full social
cost of ex post litigation is taken into account. The private beneÞt from
18

The derivatives are ∂Z/∂ 1 = –pe(D – X) < 0 and ∂Z/∂ 2 = –(1 – pe)X < 0 where Z = Va
when A doesn’t act and Va – Ve when A does act.
19

We have ∂Va/∂pe = –(1 – 2)X – 1(D – X) < 0 where Ve < 0, and ∂(Va – Ve)/∂pe = (1 –
)(D
– X) + 2X > 0 where Ve > 0. Notice, however, that an increase in p has another eVect. It
1
makes it more likely that a person will not act.
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anticipatory adjudication, however, may not change if A’s litigation cost is less
than society’s cost for both anticipatory and ex post adjudication, and in that
event the private beneÞt could be less than the social beneÞt. In contrast, we
showed earlier that for A’s who will not act in the absence of anticipatory
adjudication, the private beneÞt of such adjudication will always exceed the
social beneÞt, even if (indeed especially if) the private cost of litigation is less
than the social cost.
The analysis is similar if the ex post sanction A faces (call it d) is less than the
social damages (D) of his act. This might occur if A lacks suYcient resources to
pay D. Suppose A will act if he faces ped but not if he faces peD. In that case Ve
will be negative but since A still acts, ex post adjudication will lead to inefÞcient
conduct. This increases the social beneÞt of anticipatory adjudication that might
prevent such conduct. But if A would not act even if the maximum ex post
sanction that he was able to pay was d, the beneÞt of anticipatory adjudication
will be unaffected by the discrepancy between D and d. We give an example
from the criminal law in the next part.
II. Further Applications of the Model to Legal Doctrines
We illustrated our model with abbreviated examples of legal rules and
procedures. We now undertake a fuller examination of legal doctrine in light of
our economic analysis, emphasizing the commonalities among a number of
doctrines that lawyers have usually thought unrelated.
a. Declaratory Judgments
Were there no error in anticipatory adjudication, its net social beneÞt would
equal either (1 – pe)X – Ca for a party who would not act in the absence of
anticipatory adjudication, or pe(D – X) + (Ce – Ca) for a party who would act in
the absence of such adjudication. In the former case the net social beneÞt will be
positive provided the cost of anticipatory adjudication is less than the expected
gain from an efÞcient act (an act that would not be sanctioned ex post). In the
latter case anticipatory adjudication will always create a net social beneÞt except
in the unlikely event that the cost of such adjudication is much greater than the
cost of ex post adjudication or the parties are more likely to incur anticipatory
than ex post adjudication costs, for example because B drops his suit or the
parties settle after A acts.
The no-error condition is most likely to be approximated in situations in
which most or all of the information relevant to deciding the dispute exists
before A acts—and of course in some cases delay in adjudication may result in a
net loss of relevant information, in which event (contrary to our earlier
assumption) there will be less rather than more legal error in anticipatory
compared to ex post adjudication. That extreme case is not necessary to support
our point. Suppose that Mr. A plans to marry Ms. B but is uncertain whether he
already is legally married. No additional information would be generated
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(though we may assume that none would be lost, either) by postponing the
judicial decision until after A marries B, which in this case may mean that the
case is never decided.20 Or suppose that A would like to build a house on a parcel
of land the title to which is uncertain. His going ahead and building will cast no
additional light on the issue of title.
These are good cases for the use of the declaratory judgment, and in fact the
rules concerning the issuance of declaratory judgments seem broadly consistent
with our analysis of the device, which emphasizes error costs. A federal court
will not issue such a judgment unless the dispute is fully ripe, a requirement
normally not satisÞed unless the facts bearing on the plaintiff’s entitlement to
judgment have already occurred, so that the no (incremental) error condition is
approximated. It has always seemed a bit odd that the courts should insist that
the declaratory-judgment procedure is fully consistent with Article III’s
requirement that federal courts may adjudicate only actual cases and
controversies. The oddness is dispelled when it is understood that this
requirement is related to a desire to minimize the error costs of anticipatory
adjudication by identifying classes of cases, some of them declaratory-judgment
actions, in which the facts bearing on legal entitlement are in existence rather
than contingent even though no one has yet been injured, for example by making
a bigamous marriage or by building on land owned by someone else.21 Even
where declaratory relief would meet the Article III criteria, the court has
discretion to refuse to grant it; this is a further safeguard against the use of the
device to obtain a private gain but impose a social loss.
Implicit in our model is another economic advantage of declaratory
judgments. The ordinary ex post lawsuit has two phases: liability and remedy.
Even when the plaintiff is seeking equitable relief rather than damages, the
lawyers and the judge will have to spend some time formulating an appropriate
decree. Because a party seeking a declaratory judgment has not yet acted,
however, the court only determines liability; it does not specify a coercive
(equitable) or monetary remedy. Thus, Ca will be small relative to Ce for declaratory judgments, and may be absolutely small as well. If the losing party will
comply once the issue of liability is authoritatively resolved, he—in fact both
20

At least if we ignore the possibility that someone may know that A is already married but
become aware of A’s plans to marry again only after A marries B. This possibility could be taken
care of by the court’s requiring A to post some sort of public notice before the court will
adjudicate the question whether A is already married.
21

“In general, the declaratory-judgment technique seems most valuable in controversies in
which the relevant facts are ascertainable before actual harm has been suVered.” Note, “Judicial
Determinations in Nonadversarial Proceedings,” 72 Harvard Law Review 723, 731 (1959).
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parties, plus the court—can economize on the expense of litigation by seeking
only declaratory relief.22
In an effort to put some empirical ßesh on our theoretical skeleton, we
collected all federal district court opinions in 1991 in cases in which at least one
party had requested declaratory relief.23 There were 282 such cases in all. The
largest category, consisting of 97 cases, were insurance cases. This is not
surprising even though the federal courts’ jurisdiction over insurance contracts is
limited essentially to cases in which the parties are citizens of different states.
Insurance, especially liability insurance, is a favorite area for declaratory
judgment proceedings. An insurance company that violates its duty to defend
against any claim within the potential scope of a liability policy that it has issued
faces a threat of heavy sanctions, including punitive damages. It therefore has a
strong interest in obtaining a deÞnitive ruling, in advance, concerning the scope
and application of the policy. Since that scope and application depend entirely
on the terms of the insurance policy, the nature of the event giving rise to the
claim in the liability suit, and the nature of that claim—all things that will be
known at the time the declaration is sought—the error costs of anticipatory
adjudication are low.
The second largest category in our sample, consisting of 58 cases, is judicial
review of administrative action. This category illustrates the last economy of
declaratory judgments that we identiÞed, for these suits are brought against
federal agencies, which can be expected to comply with an authoritative judicial
declaration of the plaintiff’s rights. This feature lowers the cost of anticipatory
relative to ex post litigation because the former avoids the costs of the remedial
phase of litigation.
As nearly as we can determine from the opinions, in none of the 170 cases in
which declaratory relief was granted, but in 14 of the 67 in which it was denied
(the others not having been Þnally decided by the end of 1991), would
withholding adjudication have enabled the obtaining of additional information
bearing on the merits of the suit.
b. Res Judicata
The doctrine of res judicata precludes the relitigation by either party of a case
between them that has resulted in a Þnal judgment on the merits. The doctrine of
collateral estoppel (which we do not discuss in this paper) precludes the
relitigation, in what may otherwise be an entirely different kind of case, of a
speciÞc issue (usually factual) that was actually litigated and determined in a
case that went to Þnal judgment. These doctrines are anticipatory in the sense
22

In this respect, declaratory judgment proceedings resemble bifurcated liability-damages
trials, on which see William M. Landes, “Sequential versus Unitary Trials: An Economic
Analysis,” 22 Journal of Legal Studies 99 (1993).
23

Details of our study are available from us on request.
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that they control or inßuence the outcome of a future lawsuit. They relate to our
earlier discussion in an even more direct sense, to which we will limit our
analysis, because an important feature of anticipatory judgments is that they can
be pleaded as res judicata in a subsequent case.
Suppose that if A obtains a declaratory judgment, giving him a green light to
act, and he does act and is sued, and the court decides that the declaratory
judgment had been issued in error, A will be sanctioned ex post—that is, the
declaratory judgment will not be given preclusive effect. Since we are assuming
in this example that ex post litigation reverses an error in anticipatory
adjudication, it may seem a powerful case for rejecting res judicata as a general
doctrine, at least in cases where the judgment sought to be given preclusive effect
was rendered in an anticipatory rather than an ex post litigation. A fuller
analysis, however, shows that this conclusion is incorrect.
1. A will not act in the absence of anticipatory adjudication. Consider Þrst the
situation in which Ve = X – pD – Ce < 0, so that A will not act in the absence of
anticipatory adjudication. Let pe|a be the (conditional) probability that A will be
found liable for damages D in ex post litigation if he prevailed in anticipatory
adjudication. So (recalling that 1 – pa is the probability that A’s act will be found
lawful in anticipatory adjudication),
pe|a = pe1/(1 – pa).

(8)

If anticipatory adjudication operated with zero error, or if the judgment in that
adjudication could be pleaded as res judicata, pe|a would be zero. Otherwise it
would be positive, but smaller than if A would act without the beneÞt of a
favorable judgment in the anticipatory adjudication, because pe|a < pe.24 The
reason that A’s who are successful in anticipatory adjudication are more likely to
prevail ex post is not that a court is unwilling to change its mind (we are
assuming that res judicata is not applied when the Þrst adjudication was anticipatory) but that those A’s who lose at the anticipatory stage will not act and
hence will not be sued ex post.25 Only A’s who win anticipatory suits will
24

From equation (8) it follows that pe|a < pe if 1 < (1 – pa). Substituting (3) for 1 – pa and
rearranging terms yields pe|a < pe if 1 < (1 – 2). The latter condition holds because we have
assumed that the probability that a court will Þnd A’s prospective act lawful is smaller when that
act would be found unlawful ex post.
25

For remember that we are discussing here A’s who will not act without anticipatory
adjudication—that is, without prevailing in anticipatory adjudication. The result in the text holds
even though A’s loss at the anticipatory stage may be reversed in ex post litigation. The
probability of A’s losing the anticipatory adjudication, pa, equals pe(1 – 1) + (1 – pe) 2, and the
probability of A’s losing ex post given such a loss equals pe(1 – 1)/pa which is greater than pe
since 1 < 1 – 2. In the class of cases in which A will not act without anticipatory adjudication,
Ve, the expected value of ex post adjudication, is equal to X – peD – Ce < 0, and will be an even
greater negative number if A has already lost at the anticipatory stage, since then pe(1 – 1)/pa
substitutes for pe.
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subsequently be sued, and this group is comprised of persons who are less likely
to be sanctioned ex post than the universe of A’s who seek and obtain
anticipatory adjudication.26
If A wins the anticipatory adjudication, he will act, risking the (now lower)
probability of being sanctioned ex post.27 Still, the probability is positive, which
reduces the private as opposed to social value of anticipatory adjudication.
Earlier we showed that A’s private value from anticipatory adjudication
[equation (4)] exceeded the social value because it excluded –pe1D, the expected
harm created by Type I error. If, however, a court can correct its mistake ex post,
A’s private value from anticipatory adjudication will equal
Wa* = (1 – pa)(X – pe|aD – Ce) – Ca
= (1 – pa)X – pe1D – (1 – pa)Ce – Ca.

(9)
(10)

Putting to one side the additional cost of ex post litigation [which equals (1 –
pa)Ce], we can see that the effect of rejecting res judicata is to align the private
and social values of anticipatory adjudication [see Va in equation (2)].
Ordinarily, a policy that aligns private and social values is socially desirable;
but for several reasons this is not true here:
1. Litigating both before and after A acts doesn’t alter A’s behavior. If A wins
at the anticipatory stage, he acts, even though there is some risk of an ex post
sanction. If he loses at the anticipatory stage, he refrains from acting. Although
fewer A’s will seek anticipatory adjudication, because the net private beneÞts are
now lower (i.e., Wa* < Wa), those who do seek and obtain it, and receive a
favorable judgment, will act. Holding them liable later, in an ex post litigation,
while it will redistribute income to injured victims of legal wrongs, will not
change the behavior that caused the wrong in the Þrst place—it has already
occurred. It is true that rejecting res judicata and thus enabling the correction of
Type I error in anticipatory adjudication would have the effect of penalizing
wrongful behavior; and it is counterintuitive that imposing an expected penalty
will not change behavior. All it will do here, however, is affect the decision to
seek anticipatory adjudication. As long as the judges, properly weighing the
danger of Type I error and other relevant factors, reject inefÞcient requests (that
26

A numerical example will illustrate. Suppose pe = .4, 1 = .1 and 2 = .1. For a party who
gets the green light in anticipatory adjudication, the probability that he will be sanctioned ex post
equals .04/(.6 x .9 + .4 x .01) = .04/.58 =.069 compared to .4 without anticipatory adjudication
Moreover, the former probability approaches zero as legal error approaches zero regardless of the
size of pe.
27

Why A will act is straightforward. Consider the reverse. A gets the green light and decides
not to act for fear of being sanctioned ex post. But then A would never have sought anticipatory
adjudication in the Þrst place because the best outcome—getting the green light—would still have
a negative value (otherwise he would act) and in addition would impose on him a litigation cost
of Ca.
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is, where Va < 0) for anticipatory adjudication, the same A’s will obtain favorable
anticipatory judgments, and therefore act, as would do so if the judgment could
be used as res judicata in an ex post lawsuit. The only (though not necessarily a
negligible) social saving would come from the decline in the number of request
for anticipatory adjudications.
The qualiÞcation “as long as the judges, properly weighing the danger of
Type I error and other relevant factors, reject inefÞcient requests for anticipatory
adjudication” is critical. If judges had no discretion to turn down requests for
anticipatory adjudication and such decisions could be pleaded as res judicata, the
number of anticipatory adjudications would exceed the socially efÞcient number.
By aligning private and social values, rejecting res judicata would reduce the
demand for and hence the number of socially excessive anticipatory
adjudications, and the resulting social gain might more than offset the cost of
additional ex post proceedings. This suggests two hypotheses: The more
discretion that courts have to deny requests for anticipatory adjudication —and
recall that judges do have discretion to decline to render declaratory relief, even if
jurisdictional requirements are satisÞed—(a) the more likely is the outcome of
anticipatory adjudication to be treated as res judicata in ex post litigation, and (b)
the greater is the precedential weight likely to be given to anticipatory
judgments. Discretion allows judges to eliminate those requests where p1D is
high and (for this or other reasons) the social value of anticipatory adjudication is
signiÞcantly below A’s private value. Without such discretion, courts may
commit costly mistakes in anticipatory adjudication. One way to limit the
consequences of such mistakes is to allow them to be corrected ex post by not
giving anticipatory judgments precedential weight. In declining to give a
decision much weight as precedent, courts sometimes do cite factors that may
have denied the earlier court full information, such as that the full consequences
of the defendant’s actions could not have been known.
2. Ex post adjudication involves an expected cost that must be deducted from
the social value of anticipatory litigation, when as a result of rejecting res judicata
an ex post adjudication is a predictable error-correction follow-up to anticipatory
adjudication. If the judgment in the anticipatory adjudication has res judicata
effect, no ex post suits will be Þled, and the costs of those suits will be saved. If
every time A wins the anticipatory adjudication he will be sued after he acts,
anticipatory adjudication will eliminate ex post litigation only if A loses in the
Þrst stage, so the social value of the device will decline by the expected cost of
the subsequent litigation [which equals (1 – pa)Ce]. More realistically, if A wins
the anticipatory adjudication he faces a probability rather than a certainty of
being sued ex post. Moreover, the probability of A’s losing ex post after he has
won at the anticipatory stages is lower than pe, which reduces the incentive for a
plaintiff to sue ex post. And the parties may settle after A wins the anticipatory
stage, since the outcome at that stage generates information about the likely
outcome of ex post litigation. When these reÞnements are taken into account our
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general argument—that res judicata reduces litigation costs—still holds, but with
diminished force.
3. Apart from efÞciency concerns, suppose it is thought a very good thing on
corrective justice grounds to correct judicial error in order to prevent injurers
from getting away with not compensating their victims. Even this would be a
weak reason for refusing to treat anticipatory judgments as res judicata,
provided that, as argued earlier, anticipatory adjudications with binding effect
(such as declaratory judgment suits) tend to be limited to disputes in which the
relevant information exists before a party acts, so that the error costs are unlikely
to exceed those of ex post adjudication.28
2. A will act in the absence of anticipatory adjudication. For the party who will act
in the absence of anticipatory adjudication (that is, for whom Ve > 0), the social
value of anticipatory adjudication equals pe(1 – 1)D – paX + (Ce – Ca) [see
equation (5)]; the private value equals peD – paX + (Ce – Ca) [see equation (7)]; and
the private exceeds the social value by pe1D. It might seem that the principal
private and social beneÞt of anticipatory adjudication—preventing A from
undertaking a socially harmful action—would be eliminated (or at least greatly
reduced) if the actor were not bound by an adverse judgment in the anticipatory
adjudication, that is, if res judicata were rejected. But this turns out to be false.
Consider Þrst the case where anticipatory adjudication gives A the green light
to act. A will act: since pe|a < pe, the expected value of A’s acting conditional on
A’s winning the anticipatory adjudication (which equals X – pe|aD – Ce), exceeds
Ve > 0. It is true that because of Type I error that we are assuming is corrected in
ex post litigation, some A’s who succeeded in anticipatory adjudication will still
be sanctioned. But, as we showed earlier, ex post sanctions do not prevent
wrongful acts from occurring. Thus, eliminating res judicata for A’s who get the
green light to act in anticipatory adjudication actually reduces social welfare, by
adding costly ex post litigation with no offsetting efÞciency gain.29
Now suppose that A loses the anticipatory adjudication. If that outcome
could be pleaded as res judicata, A would not act; for if he did, he would be
28

Another possible eVect of rejecting res judicata may be to increase the size of legal error in
anticipatory adjudication. Assuming ex post litigation corrects legal error in anticipatory
adjudication, there may be less incentive to spend resources to improve accuracy at the
anticipatory stage. Whether this reduces eYciency is unclear. Greater legal error reduces the value
of anticipatory adjudication but reducing the expenditures on such adjudication will raise its
value.
29

Allowing for the extra cost of litigating ex post if A wins at the anticipatory stage, we have
Va = (1 – pa)(X – Ce) – pe 1D – Ca. Both the social (Va – Ve) and private (Wa* – Ve) values of
anticipatory adjudication equal pe(1 – 1) D – paX + paCe – Ca. The social value falls because
equation (5) included Ce – Ca as a beneÞt, since ex post litigation was assumed to be more costly
than anticipatory litigation. Here Va – Ve includes the smaller and possibly negative savings of
paCe – Ca.
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sanctioned with certainty, and we know that X < D. But what if A is not bound
by the adverse judgment in the anticipatory adjudication? Since the court may
have mistakenly held A’s prospective act harmful (thus committing a Type II
error), might A act in the hope that the court will reverse its error? The answer is
no; for if A would act in that situation, he would never have requested
anticipatory adjudication to begin with (nor would an efÞciency-motivated court
have granted such a request) since both its social and private expected value
would be negative.30 That is, if anticipatory adjudication has no bearing on
whether or not A acts, and ex post adjudication always follows A’s act,
anticipatory adjudication involves costs but no beneÞts. Granted, the assumption
that ex post litigation always follow anticipatory adjudication is unrealistic.
Indeed, since the party who loses the anticipatory adjudication will have an even
lower probability of winning ex post litigation, he will have a reduced incentive
to sue ex post, compared with the situation in which anticipatory adjudication is
unavailable. Still, rejecting res judicata would raise litigation costs overall as long
as some persons who lost at the anticipatory stage would seek to litigate ex post.
c. Victim’s Request for Anticipatory Adjudication: Injunctions, the Criminal
Punishment of Preparatory Acts, and Anticipatory Breach of Contract.
The focus of part I was on the social and private value of anticipatory
adjudication to the party who seeks such an adjudication in order to authorize
him to proceed with some act. What about the party who may be injured by that
act? Shifting the focus to him is equivalent to asking whether he would prefer
obtaining an injunction to prevent future harm or waiting until the defendant
acts and seeking damages for any harm done by the act. While for A the choice is
between seeking legal permission now and taking his chances on being sued
later, the choice for B (the potential victim) is between suing now to prevent A
from acting and suing later to recover damages for the injury inßicted by the act.
B might request anticipatory adjudication, or, equivalently, an injunction
against A’s acting. He would not do this if he thought that A would not act
without such an adjudication, unless he had a strong desire for a precedent. For
apart from the cost of suing, the court might make a mistake and Þnd A’s act
lawful. Consider B’s options if, even without the go-ahead signal of an
anticipatory adjudication in A’s favor, A will act, inßicting harm on B with probability pe. B will be compensated ex post for his damages, so he has nothing to
lose from sitting back and waiting for A to act except his litigation costs in the ex
30

If A acts even if loses the anticipatory adjudication, then Ve|a = X – [pe(1 – 1)/pa]D – Ce >
0, where [pe(1 – 1)/pa] is the probability that A will lose ex post, conditional on losing at the
anticipatory stage. Multiplying by pa yields paX – pe(1 – 1)D – paCe > 0, or alternatively pe(1 –
1)D – paX + paCe < 0. Then both the social and private value of anticipatory adjudication, which
equals Va – Ve = Wa* – Ve =pe(1 – 1)D – paX + (paCe – Ca), are both negative. We also know that
A will act in the absence of anticipatory adjudication (since Ve > 0 by assumption) and that he will
act if he wins the anticipatory adjudication, since Ve|a > Ve > 0.

Economics of Anticipatory Adjudication

23

post suit.31 If instead B asks the court to enjoin A before he acts, B faces an
expected loss of pe1D—his expected damages (peD) discounted by 1, the
probability that the court in an anticipatory adjudication will incorrectly Þnd that
A’s act is lawful. The offset is the saving in litigation costs from anticipatory
compared to ex post litigation. Unless those savings are great enough to
compensate for the expected loss pe1D, B will prefer to seek damages rather than
an injunction or a declaratory judgment.
Once we relax some of the assumptions in our model, however, B’s incentive
to seek anticipatory relief emerges. To begin with, the risk of Type I error is
reduced by the rule that Þndings and conclusions made in a preliminaryinjunction hearing are tentative and may be reexamined in the full ex post
litigation that will ensue if the preliminary injunction is denied and A goes ahead
and acts. However, this rule does not apply to permanent injunctions.
Also, A may lack the resources to compensate B fully for the harm created by
A’s act (or, what amounts to same thing, the damage award rendered in ex post
litigation is not fully compensatory). Then B’s expected cost of ex post
adjudication will equal his uncompensated harm (= pe(D – d), where d denotes
the maximum that A can pay B) plus his litigation costs. These losses may more
than offset B’s expected loss from Type I error in anticipatory adjudication,32
especially if that loss is reduced by the rule that Þndings of fact and conclusions
of law made in the preliminary-injunction hearing are tentative.
We note several additional points:
1. Lacking sufÞcient resources to pay B’s damages, A will be more likely to
act if there is no anticipatory litigation, and hence will be less likely to institute
such litigation (and more likely to oppose it, when it is instituted by B) because
he has less to lose from ex post adjudication.
2. The social interest in anticipatory compared to ex post adjudication is
greater when A cannot pay B’s full damages, because, if A acts, the social beneÞt
when adjudication takes place ex post is less than A’s private beneÞt (that is, X –
peD is less than X – ped). This is the economic rationale for the criminal
punishment of preparatory acts that inßict no harm (failed attempts, solicitations,
31

Of course, he will be compensated only if he is damaged and the act is unlawful, but that is
why D must be discounted by pe. We assume that the “American” rule is in force (no shifting of
the winning party’s attorney’s fees to the losing party) and, as earlier, that ex post adjudication
operates free from legal error.
32

B’s expected loss from ex post and anticipatory adjudication equal pe(D – d) + Ce and pe 1D
+ Ca respectively so his gain from anticipatory adjudications equals pe(1 – 1)D – ped + (Ce – Ca),
which is more likely to be positive the smaller is Type I error, and the larger is D relative to d. If d
= D (so A can pay B’s full damages) then B will prefer ex post litigation unless B’s extra litigation
cost (which equals Ce – Ca) oVsets the error costs (pe 1D) of anticipatory adjudication.
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and conspiracies and reckless driving that does not result in an accident),33 a
form of anticipatory adjudication instituted by the victim (represented by the
state). For the completed act, D is likely to be far greater than d—indeed d will
often be zero and D very high. The probability that the completed act would be
unlawful is also very high given that the government’s burden in the
preparatory-act case is the standard prosecutor’s burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Type II error in this form of anticipatory adjudication is further minimized by the requirement that the attempt have progressed to the point
where the defendant’s intention and capacity to commit the completed crime are
clear. Conspiracy is punishable at an earlier point but requires proof of
agreement, the agreement being some evidence that the defendant is actually
dangerous.
3. Another form of victim-initiated anticipatory litigation in the criminal area
is preventive detention. If bail is denied to an accused on the ground that he is
likely to commit further crimes while he is out on bail awaiting trial, in effect the
prosecutor as agent of the defendant’s potential victims is seeking on the basis of
the bail hearing to prevent damage that may be difÞcult to deter by ex post
adjudication, since, again, d may be much smaller than D. A complicating factor
not present in our earlier examples is that the anticipatory adjudication may
create error costs in the ex post adjudication, since being incarcerated while
awaiting trial may make it more difÞcult for the defendant to prepare an
adequate defense.34
4. Suppose as in the usual criminal case that the net social beneÞt of A’s acting
(Ve = X – peD – Ce) is negative, but that A will still act when adjudication is ex
post because his private beneÞt (We = X – ped – ce) will be positive. Anticipatory
adjudication is likely to be socially beneÞcial because pe and D – X are high and
Type II error is low.35 Granted, the fact that Type I error may be high (because it
is a criminal proceeding) reduces the beneÞt of anticipatory adjudication. Even
though an acquittal on a charge of attempt, conspiracy, reckless driving, and so
forth is not a green light to commit the completed crime, A will still act (X – ped >
0) and cause net harm since, by assumption, Ve is negative. However, with A
identiÞed as a potential offender, his chances of being apprehended and
convicted if he goes ahead and commits the completed crime after having been
acquitted of the attempted crime will rise, so that even in the case where Type I
error occurs there will be some beneÞt from the anticipatory adjudication.
33

Richard A. Posner, “An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law,” 85 Columbia Law Review
1193, 1217 (1985); Steven Shavell, “Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions
as a Deterrent,” 85 Columbia Law Review 1232, 1249-1250 (1985).
34

William M. Landes, “The Bail System: An Economic Approach,” 2 Journal of Legal Studies 79
(1973).
35

From equation (5) we can write the net gain from this form of anticipatory adjudication
(ignoring litigation costs) as pe(1 – 1)(D – X) – (1 – pe) 2X, where D > X.
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5. From B’s standpoint a similar case to that of inadequate resources to satisfy
a damages judgment is that in which B always suffers a harm equal to D if A acts,
but, because of difÞculty in establishing the existence or amount of harm or its
causal relation to the defendant’s conduct, there is some probability 1 – pe that
the court in an ex post adjudication will deny B any damages or will cut them
down. B also risks harm from anticipatory adjudication, because, if A gets the goahead to act, B will suffer damages when A acts. But B may still gain from
anticipatory adjudication if he is more likely to prevent A from acting by
winning anticipatory adjudication than he is to collect damages by winning ex
post adjudication. Here, the greater Type II error, the smaller Type I error, and
the bigger the cost savings of anticipatory adjudication, the more likely is B to
prefer anticipatory to ex post adjudication.36
We mentioned the preliminary injunction, ordinarily sought to freeze the
status quo while a suit either for a permanent injunction or for damages is
wending its way to completion. The usual reason for seeking a preliminary
injunction, and a precondition to obtaining it, is that the defendant’s conduct is
inßicting irreparable harm on the plaintiff—harm that cannot be rectiÞed by the
Þnal judgment that will be entered at the end of the suit. Freezing the status quo
may, however, impose irreparable harm on the defendant—and that is
sometimes the real reason for the plaintiff’s seeking a preliminary injunction.
Courts decide whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction by comparing
the expected costs to both plaintiff and defendant of the two alternatives. Since
the decision is anticipatory, it can be modeled, using the same notation as before,
as follows: grant or deny the preliminary injunction depending on whether paD
is greater or less than (1 – pa)X, where pa is the probability that the plaintiff B will
win the suit (i.e., that the defendant is violating his rights), estimated before A
acts; D is the irreparable harm to B if the preliminary injunction is denied; and X
is the irreparable harm (i.e., the foregone gain) to A, the defendant, if it is
granted.37 This determination involves an implicit comparison of Type I and
Type II errors. The greater Type I error, the more likely a court is to deny a
preliminary injunction when the correct decision would be to grant it; and the
greater Type II error, the more likely that a preliminary injunction will be
granted when the correct decision would be to deny it.38
36

B’s expected loss from ex post and anticipatory adjudication equals (1 – pe)D + Ce and
[pe 1 + (1 – pe)(1 – 2)]D + Ca. The gain from anticipatory adjudication equals [(1 – pe) 2 –
pe 1]D + (Ce – Ca) which is more likely to be positive the greater 2, the smaller pe and 1, and
the greater Ce – Ca.
37

See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 553–54 (4th ed. 1992); American Hospital
Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products Ltd., 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1985).
38

From (6) we have pa = pe(1 – 1) +(1 – pe) 2. Thus, the decision to grant or deny a
preliminary injunction will depend on whether paD is greater or less than (1 – pa)X or whether
[pe(1 – 1) + (1 – pe) 2](D + X) – X is greater or less than zero. Thus, the smaller 1 and the
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Anticipatory breach of contract is a self-help remedy parallel to the
preliminary injunction. Suppose A and B have a contract, with A’s performance
due at time t, and at t – 1 A realizes that he will not be able to perform. There is
no breach as yet, but by declaring breach now, A may be able to reduce D by
giving B additional time to mitigate his damages by Þnding a substitute
performer. Similarly, if B has reason to believe that A will not be able to perform
when performance is due (though A denies this), B is entitled under the Uniform
Commercial Code to demand adequate assurances of performance from A,
failing which B can declare a breach and take steps to minimize his damages
without waiting for A to free him from his contractual obligations. It might seem
that A would always have an incentive to anticipate the breach, since the legal
system will shift B’s damages to him through B’s suit for breach of contract and
those damages will be lower if A has enabled B to reduce the damages. But if B’s
recovery (d) in a lawsuit instituted after the breach occurs will not fully
compensate him for his damages (D), B’s self-help remedy may be more effective
than a suit against A.
d. Advisory Opinions
The cost of legal error helps to explain why many state courts are authorized
to issue advisory opinions, at the request of the state’s executive or legislative
branches, often though not always on state constitutional issues, while federal
courts are not authorized to issue advisory opinions on any subject.39 Because the
federal constitution is more difÞcult to amend than most state constitutions are,
the costs of erroneous constitutional interpretations are greater at the federal
than at the state level. At the state level an erroneous interpretation is less likely
to prove irreparable; it can usually be corrected by an amendment in short order.
The corrective remedy at the federal level is slower and costlier.
Modifying equation (2), we can write the net beneÞt of an advisory opinion
requested by the government, for the case in which the government will not act
without a favorable opinion, as
Va = (1 – pe)(1 – 2)X – pe1[k(D – X) + c] – Ca,

(11)

where (1 – pe)(1 – 2)X is the expected beneÞt when the government is given
permission to act and pe1[k(D – X) +c] is the expected harm from a erroneous
decision allowing the government to act when it shouldn’t. X and D (> X) here
refer to the present value of beneÞts and harms, k denotes the fraction (< 1) of D
greater 2, the more likely that a preliminary injunction will be granted. We note one small
diVerence between this analysis and our analysis of anticipatory adjudication: in the latter, we
assumed that X < D whereas in the former X may be greater or less than D.
39

The prohibition against the issuance of advisory opinions by federal courts is based on (or
rationalized in terms of) the requirement of “justiciability” believed to ßow from the limitation of
the federal judicial power in Article III of the Constitution to “cases or controversies.” We
examine justiciability more broadly in subpart f.
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and X that will be realized before an erroneous decision is corrected, and c is the
cost of an amendment to correct an erroneous decision. It is obvious from (11) (as
well as common sense) that allowing the government to obtain advisory
opinions is more likely to be socially beneÞcial when it is quick and cheap to
correct an erroneous opinion by an amendment, since that implies low c and k.
In the case where the government would act in the absence of an advisory
opinion and an amendment would correct an erroneous decision telling the
government not to act when it should (Type II error), the net beneÞt of allowing
advisory opinions is given by
Va – Ve = pe(1 – 1)(D – X)
– (1 – pe)2(kX + c) + (Ce – Ca).

(12)

Here the beneÞt of an advisory opinions lies in preventing the government from
acting when that is the correct outcome, while the cost lies in sometimes telling
the government that it can’t act when it should. Again the losses from the
erroneous opinions will be small if they can be corrected by a constitutional
amendment, so again the quicker and cheaper the amendment process is, the
more likely the net beneÞt of advisory opinions is to be positive.40
Consistent with our analysis, we predict and Þnd that advisory opinions are
more common at the state than at the federal level (federal courts are forbidden
to issue advisory opinions). At the federal level they are issued only by
administrative agencies, whose advisory opinions, as we shall see, are readily
corrected. It is also not unexpected that advisory opinions are generally given
less precedential weight than opinions in adjudicated cases.41 Courts are less
likely to follow their advisory opinions than their regular opinions in subsequent
cases, because the absence from the advisory-opinion setting of both an
adversary presentation and information generated by experience with the statute
(which has not yet been enacted) that is being opined on increases the risks of
error. Giving advisory opinions less precedential weight is like correcting either
or both Type I and Type II error. If a court in ex post litigation declines to follow
an incorrect advisory opinion, the potential social loss caused by an erroneous
advisory opinion would be discounted by k, which would then refer to the
fraction of such erroneous opinions (weighted by the social loss imposed by
them) that was not corrected by ex post litigation.
40

If an amendment corrected both Type I and Type II error, equation (11) would become (1 –
pe)[X – 2(kX + c)] – pe 1[k(D – X) + c] – Ca, and the value of an advisory opinion would thus be
greater the smaller k and c were.
41

Note, “Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality of Statutes,” 69 Harvard Law Review
1302, 1303–4 (1956). This is the rule, but Comment, “The State Advisory Opinion in Perspective,”
44 Fordham Law Review 81, 82-83 (1975), suggests that in practice advisory opinions of state
supreme courts are given the same weight as other opinions of those courts. To similar effect, see
Commentary, “Advisory Opinions in Florida: An Experiment in Intergovernmental
Cooperation,” 24 University of Florida Law Review 328, 332–3 (1972).

Chicago Working Paper in Law & Economics

28

The vast majority of advisory opinions concern internal governmental affairs
(such as the scope of home rule, the extent of the governor’s veto power, and the
legality of state or local borrowing) rather than the rights of individuals or
Þrms.42 This makes sense, since with the normal requirements of standing
unsatisÞable, a regular adversary proceeding might not result in signiÞcantly
lower legal error than the advisory-opinion procedure. Although it would be
somewhat lower—because once the statute is in operation its consequences can
be observed, not just conjectured as when the statute is challenged in advance of
enactment—we shall see that adjudications brought by parties who lack standing
in the traditional sense can involve high legal-error costs.
Although we can see why states would be more likely to authorize advisory
opinions than the federal government would be, this of course does not show
that the costs of allowing federal advisory opinions would outweigh the beneÞts.
Among the beneÞts would be the considerable savings in the time required to
dispel legal uncertainty over some statute or other measure; in one state, the
average time between the request for an advisory opinion and the opinion is a
remarkable 7.5 days.43 This beneÞt would have to be compared with the increased
risk of legal error. A further consideration, however, which may help explain the
rejection of advisory opinions at the federal level, is that beyond a point judicial
systems encounter severe diseconomies of scale. Increases in demand for judicial
services, unlike other services, cannot readily be accommodated by creating new
“Þrms” (that is, new courts) without undermining consistency of legal doctrine,
or by enlarging existing courts without greatly increasing decision costs.44 Since
the federal judiciary is already one of the nation’s largest and busiest, the cost
[both the c and Ca in equation (11)] of adding an advisory jurisdiction to it in
circumstances where the government would not act in the absence of a favorable
advisory opinion would be considerable.45 True, there is an offsetting savings.
When the government would act in the absence of an advisory opinion, its act
may be followed by ex post litigation whose cost [Ce in equation (12)] will be
saved by an advisory ruling. These savings, however, may be small. The weaker
precedential signiWcance given to advisory opinions implies that ex post
litigation will not be eliminated. More important, standing and other doctrines of
justiciability would prevent ex post litigation in many cases in which
42

Comment, note 39 above, at 106, 108–9.

43

Commentary, note 39 above, at 337. In contrast, a study published in 1962 found that the
average interval between the enactment of a federal statute and the Supreme Court’s decision
invalidating it was 8.7 years. Note, “The Case for an Advisory Function in the Federal Judiciary,”
50 Georgetown Law Journal 785, 800 (1962).
44
45

Posner, note 35 above, at 580–81.

It may not be an accident that the largest state court systems, such as those of California,
New York, and Texas, also do not issue advisory opinions.
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government might have frequent resort to an advisory jurisdiction, for example
to settle interbranch conßicts that do not affect private rights.
The analysis in this section thus predicts that the willingness of a state to
permit its courts to issue advisory opinions will be negatively related both to the
volume of litigation in the state and to the difÞculty of amending the state’s
constitution. These are testable predictions.
e. The Administrative and Judicial Processes Compared
The amount of anticipatory adjudication (broadly construed) is vastly greater
in administrative agencies than in courts. Imagine calling up a judge’s law clerk
and asking for legal advice! But that sort of thing is routine in many
administrative agencies. And rules promulgated in advance of any harm are a
routine part of administrative activity, while when done by judges they are
derided as “dicta.”46 Yet at the same time, declaratory orders, the administrative
counterpart of declaratory judgments, are extremely rare.47 How to explain this
pattern?
The essential point, we conjecture, is that when the costs of adjudication to
the adjudicative institution itself (courts or agency, as the case may be), as
distinct from the parties, are incorporated into the cost of litigation, anticipatory
adjudication is much more costly for courts than for agencies; so is the risk of
error. Most American courts have general rather than specialized jurisdictions.
This both increases the number of potential requests for advice or advance rulings and, because the information economies enabled by specialization are not
available, increases the risk of incremental error if the court does not have the
beneÞt of a full adversary presentation. Stated differently but equivalently, it
costs the court more than the agency to reduce the risk of error by the same
amount. The “records” on which agencies act in rulemaking proceedings are of
poor quality compared to trial records (they are full of hearsay and witnesses are
not subject to cross-examination), but this is not critical because the agency does
not come to the case without prior knowledge of the subject matter, as would a
court.
Courts on the European continent differ from English and American courts in
being more specialized and in having career judges rather than judges appointed
46

This derision, by the way, illustrates the important general point that anticipatory
adjudications are likely to have less precedential force than ex post adjudications, because of
higher error costs.
47

Burnell V. Powell, “Sinners, Supplicants, and Samaritans: Agency Advice Giving in
Relation to Section 554(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act,” 63 North Carolina Law Review 339
(1985). However, though not remarked in Professor Powell’s excellent article, the National Labor
Relations Board routinely issues something closely akin to declaratory orders. nlrb orders, though
in form remedial, are not binding until enforced by a court. Often, if the respondent does not
challenge the order in court but instead indicates his willingness to comply with it, the nlrb will
not seek judicial enforcement. See nlrb v. p*i*e Nationwide, Inc., 894 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1990).
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(or elected) from practice. We predict that those courts would render
anticipatory adjudication more freely than Anglo-American courts do.
Statutes enforced by administrative agencies often prescribe heavy penalties
for violations of agency rules. This places persons and Þrms subject to those rules
in a quandary. If they believe that a rule is invalid and violate it in order to
obtain a judicial determination of its validity, and they are wrong, they will pay a
heavy penalty [this is the case of a high D with probability pe in equation (1)]. If
therefore they comply with the rule, they will forgo the opportunity to challenge
it and they will thus lose a beneÞt equal to X. To prevent these losses, the
Supreme Court held in the Abbott Laboratories case that persons subject to an
agency rule can seek declaratory or injunctive relief before the rule goes into
effect.48 Since the penalties for violating agency rules are sometimes criminal, the
“pre-enforcement” judicial review authorized by Abbott Laboratories illustrates
the operation of anticipatory adjudication in a criminal context. Because losing
such a review proceeding does not result in the imposition of a criminal
penalty—the plaintiff has not yet violated the rule, so hasn’t yet committed a
crime even if the rule is valid—the criminal burden of proof is not imposed.
Although the cost of anticipatory adjudication is generally lower to an agency
than to a court because of greater specialization and larger staff (see next
paragraph), it might appear puzzling that agencies make less rather than more
use of declaratory orders than courts do of declaratory judgments. An agency,
however, has substitute anticipatory procedures that cost less because they do
not require satisfaction of the conditions of an Article III case or controversy—
conditions imposed on courts in declaratory judgment proceedings as in other
proceedings because of the courts’ lack of specialized knowledge.
Advice by agency staff deserves separate consideration. Often such advice is
not binding, in recognition of the high potential error costs, since the staff has
less information about the correct decision of the case than the members of the
agency, who are the authoritative decision makers (commissioners of the ftc,
members of the nlrb, etc.). This reduces the beneÞts of the advice. At the same
time, its costs may be very low—even zero. With less to gain or lose from the
advice, a person wishing advice from the agency may spend little or no money
on employing a lawyer to frame his request in the manner most likely to elicit a
favorable ruling. This is a common consequence of the offer of the Internal
Revenue Service to answer taxpayers’ questions. The answers have no binding
effect, so taxpayers do not hesitate to put questions to the irs without bothering
to obtain the assistance of a lawyer. The irs’s private letter rulings are binding, so
48

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). There is a close parallel, outside the
administrative context, in the rule of Ex Parte Young which permits a declaratory or injunctive
action for the purpose of testing the validity of a statute before the person bringing the action has
violated it. See Illinois v. General Electric Co., 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982).
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taxpayers invariably hire counsel to frame and support the request for such a
ruling.
We can see now why it seems so odd to imagine persons’ being permitted to
request advice from judges’ law clerks. Either law clerks would have to be
trained in rendering advisory opinions over the whole extent of their courts’
jurisdiction, or, if their advice were nonbinding, they would be ßooded with
requests for nonbinding advice because persons making such requests would not
have to hire lawyers to frame the request—in effect they would be “hiring” the
law clerks, at zero cost, as their lawyers. Either way, the character of judicial
staffs would be transformed. This hypothetical situation underscores our earlier
point that anticipatory adjudication is unlikely to be worthwhile when all it does
is replace private legal advice.
f. Justiciability
The legal term justiciability refers to the complex of limitations on federal
judicial competence that has been found to be implicit in Article III of the
Constitution. The plaintiff must actually have been (or be about to be) injured by
the defendant’s conduct (standing). The relief sought by the plaintiff must
actually be beneÞcial to him (mootness). The parties’ dispute must have progressed to the point where it is plain that they have a dispute (ripeness), so
ordinarily a person cannot challenge the constitutionality of a statute if it is
unclear whether the statute will even be applied to him. The dispute must be
real, not contrived or collusive. If any of these requirements is not satisÞed, the
suit will be dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff is seeking an advisory
opinion.
The concept of justiciability can be interpreted, though only in part, as a
limitation on anticipatory adjudication. For example, if an ex post suit is unripe,
or we can’t tell whether the plaintiff B is likely actually to be injured, the suit
becomes equivalent to anticipatory adjudication with substantial legal error (1
and 2). It is not strictly anticipatory, because A has acted; but a more realistic
view of “action” would make it comprehend the entire sequence of acts that
must occur before there will be full information about A’s and B’s legal
entitlements. So if A has acted (perhaps by passing a statute potentially but not
certainly applicable to B) but the impact of the act on B is not yet determinable
(perhaps because the scope of the statute is unclear and has yet to be deÞned by
the government agency responsible for enforcing it), an immediate suit by B to
invalidate the statute would be, functionally, “anticipatory.”49
B would have an interest in bringing such a suit if his expected recovery were
greater than if he waited. This condition is more likely to be fulÞlled the smaller
49

Suits for injunctions, or motions for preliminary injunctions, which we have classiÞed as
anticipatory, are usually of the same character: the defendant has already acted, but the plaintiV
sues before he has been injured, or injured badly.
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Type I error is (by which A would escape liability for harming B); the greater
Type II error (for such error means that B collects from an “innocent” A—one
who would be exonerated from liability in a ripe suit); and the greater the
litigation cost savings to B from an early suit.50 We showed in part I that the
greater Type I and Type II error is, the lower is the social beneÞt of anticipatory
adjudication and the more likely that the beneÞt will actually be negative. So
deeming a suit “unripe” is a convenient label for refusing to adjudicate a dispute
when the social beneÞt from waiting probably exceeds the increase in cost, if any,
of deferring adjudication until more information is available. In some cases there
will be no increase in cost from waiting: Either the availability of additional
information facilitates convergent estimates of a trial outcome and so makes
settlement more likely, or B’s fear that A’s action will injure him proves
groundless so that there is no ex post litigation at all.
In the case of a collusive suit, which often will be motivated by the parties’
desire to obtain authoritative legal advice in order to guide their choice of
actions, the court will lack the beneÞt of an adversary presentation. The
likelihood of legal error will again be great. Anglo-American courts lack
adequate staff to investigate and resolve factual and legal questions without the
aid of the parties, and that “aid” will be warped if the parties agree on the
outcome of the case. As in the case of an unripe suit, greater legal error will
reduce the beneÞt of both anticipatory and ex post adjudication.
Let us examine the case in which, after a full trial and a decision by the trial
court, and while the case is pending on appeal, something happens to “moot” the
case. Maybe the plaintiff was a food distributor suing for permission to sell some
exotic food that he had imported into this country, the food had been
impounded pending the resolution of the suit, and while impounded the food
spoiled and now can no longer be sold. The appeals court will dismiss the suit as
moot, without reaching the merits. And yet, on the one hand, since all the
relevant facts bearing on the controversy over the denial of permission exist and
are unaffected by the fact that the case has become moot, error costs would not
be increased by the appeals court’s deciding the case; while, on the other hand,
since the plaintiff can no longer beneÞt from winning the suit, why doesn’t he
just abandon it, in which event the issue of mootness would itself be moot? The
Þrst point suggests that cases shouldn’t be dismissed on grounds of mootness,
the second that the issue of mootness is unlikely to arise.
The point about error costs is correct. The second point, however, ignores the
fact that once the case has been submitted and is awaiting decision, A’s
50

Let B’s expected recovery equal paD – Ca in the unripe suit and peD – Ce in the ripe suit
where pa and pe are deÞned as before—pa reXects legal error because the suit being unripe is
anticipatory. The diVerence between B’s expected recovery in the unripe and ripe suit will equal
[(1 – pe) 2 – pe 1)]D + (Ce – Ca) which is more likely to be positive the greater 2, the smaller 1,
and the greater Ce – Ca.
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incremental litigation cost is zero and A may expect to undertake similar acts in
the future. Thus the issue becomes one of anticipatory adjudication—the value of
a decision in the present case provides guidance or resolution in a subsequent
suit. In our hypothetical case, a decision that provides information on the
lawfulness of A’s act—even though B’s dropping the case gives A the go-ahead
to act now and receive X—may be valuable to A because he thinks he may
someday want to import a similar food again. A favorable decision will have
precedential value to him, while an adverse decision will allow him to escape a
future liability by avoiding the commission of an act that is sure to be sanctioned.
But it is unclear whether the social beneÞt from deciding a moot case is positive.
Apart from the cost to the judiciary of deciding the case, the beneÞt of the
decision will be less than if the parties had an actual dispute to be settled,
because the probability of their having a future dispute is less than 1.
Nevertheless, the legal-error costs are lower than in other cases where
anticipatory adjudication is refused. In the special case of an issue capable of
repetition but avoiding judicial review (say the legality of abortion, where a
challenge to an abortion statute will be mooted after nine months by the birth of
the child, but the woman anticipates a subsequent pregnancy that she may want
to abort), courts allow a “moot” case to be decided. The case is technically moot
because by the time it is decided the woman will have either had the abortion or
had the child. But since ex post adjudication is therefore infeasible—should she
again get pregnant and again sue to invalidate the statute she will again be unable to obtain an adjudication before her pregnancy ends—the incremental legalerror costs of anticipatory adjudication are actually negative, because
anticipatory adjudication is the only available method of avoiding an erroneous
denial of legal rights.
In all of these cases, although we have been emphasizing error costs, an
equally important consideration is that the value of anticipatory adjudication is
less, the smaller the likelihood that ex post adjudication will occur if anticipatory
adjudication is refused. A central concern of the “case or controversy”
requirement of Article III (which subsumes such doctrines as ripeness, mootness,
no advisory opinions, and standing) is with avoiding the costs of anticipatory
adjudication when the adjudication is likely to be not a substitute for an ex post
adjudication but a net addition to the judicial workload.
When we turn to the doctrine of standing, we encounter an aspect of
justiciability that is only tangentially related to anticipatory adjudication,
although the underlying concern with legal error as a basis for refusing
adjudication is similar. The conventional rationale for the requirement of
standing is that if a plaintiff isn’t tangibly hurt by the defendant’s conduct, or,
hurt or not, doesn’t have anything tangible to gain from a judgment against the
defendant, he won’t put up a good Þght and the court will face a one-sided
presentation, which will increase the risk of legal error. This is the ground on
which federal taxpayers are barred from bringing suits to challenge public
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spending programs that may result in an increase in federal income tax rates and
citizens are barred from challenging government programs that they dislike but
can’t demonstrate a common law type of injury from (maybe the challenged
program degrades the environment—in another country). Yet it is apparent that
the organizations which bring such suits have both the desire and the resources
to mount a vigorous defense of their position, so that the court will in fact have
the beneÞt of a balanced adversary presentation of the relevant factual and legal
issues.
Two economic rationales can be conjectured for the doctrine of standing
when it is applied to bar suits by nonvictims. The Þrst, illustrated by the
examples of taxpayer and citizen suits, is that it cuts down on the role of interest
groups in the litigation process, perhaps in recognition that, almost by deÞnition,
such groups have effective political remedies. Second, in some cases rules of
standing are necessary in order to allocate property rights to legal claims. If A
violates B’s legal rights to B’s injury, but anyone can sue to redress the violation,
B’s rights may be illusory. Lacking effective legal protection, he may substitute
some less efÞcient method of self-protection. Potential tort victims, for example,
may take excessive care to avoid being injured, if their ability to obtain
compensation for a tortious injury is undermined by a litigation derby, even
though it might be more efÞcient for potential injurers to take more care instead.
The social function of legal rights will therefore be impaired.51
Conclusion
We have developed an economic model to examine a variety of issues united
by the common thread that a person or Þrm is seeking a ruling from a court or
agency in advance of the sort of actual or imminently threatened harm that is
required for a classic adjudication. We have argued that the traditional
reluctance of generalist courts, such as the federal courts, to engage in
anticipatory adjudication can be explained on economic grounds. We further
have argued that the apparent exceptions to this reluctance, as well as the more
receptive attitude of administrative agencies toward anticipatory adjudication,
can also be explained in terms of the elements of our model. Our analysis
suggests that there are many issues within the forbidding (to economists)
domain of federal jurisdiction and administrative law that can be illuminated by
economics, as well as connected with the aid of economics to subjects, such as res
judicata, criminal punishment of preparatory acts, preliminary injunctions, and
anticipatory breaches of contract, that generally are believed to belong to
separate and unrelated Þelds of law.
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